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1 
I. 
After the stock market crash of 1929, Congress established the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 allowed the Federal 
Reserve Board (FRB) the authority to set initial, maintenance, and short sale 
requirements on all securities traded on a national exchange. The purpose was to regulate 
the securities credit extended by exchange members. The FRB also established 
Regulation T (Reg T), the rules governing the percentage of equity value a broker/dealer 
was allowed to lend on exchange-traded securities. The securities markets had a long 
history of federal margin regulation, but in 1992 the U.S. Congress had extended the 
FRB's margin-setting authority to include the levels for future products. 
The maximum loan value of a security is determined by the initial margin 
requirements. If the original margin requirement was set at 40%, an investor could post 
collateral and borrow up to 60% ofthe securities value. Alternatively, if the investor 
were to buy the security on margin, the investor would be required to deposit at least 40% 
of the value of the security in a margin account to finish the margin transaction. 
Margin requirements in equity derivative markets are collateral requirements 
designed to ensure contract performance. From an economic standpoint, there is no 
extension of credit in equity derivative markets. Despite differences in their form and 
function, the margin requirements on equity derivatives contracts affect the cost of taking 
positions and naturally define the maximqm amount of return leverage that can be 
achieved in such contracts. 
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The 1934 U.S. Congress conceived federal margin authority with three apparent 
objectives: to protect investors from over lagging, to reduce the use of excessive credit in 
securities transactions, and to reduce the volatility of stock prices. The Congress 
apparently believed that a federal margin policy could be used to regulate the amount of 
credit allocated to unproductive investment in the stock market and thereby decreases the 
effects of destabilizing speculation on stock prices. The dominant view in Congress held 
that a fixed pool of credit was available to support investment activities, and any credit 
used to purchase stocks was unavailable to finance helpful investments in plant and 
equipment. Further, it was widely believed that stock-related credit defended the 
activities of speculators, whose trading activities supposedly created unnecessary 
volatility in the stock market. 
The U.S. Congress may still hold the view that margin requirements can be 
effective as a selective credit control. As federal margin authority has yet to be repealed, 
these margins can be useful as a tool for stabilizing stock prices. According to 
Jegadeesh, "The majority of the finance profession appears to have abandoned the 
beliefs that underlie the original margin authority mandate. Few believe that selected 
credit controls, inappropriate as rules for investor protection, are unlikely to be useful in 
controlling stock price volatility."l 
Before to the 1987 stock market crash, little evidence suggested that margin 
policy was effective in achieving the goals behind the 1934 authorization. "By the early 
1980's, the academic research on margin policy had shifted focus from evaluating the 
I Gordon, G. "Security Baskets and Index Linked Securities," Journal of Business 66, no. 1 (1993), 1-28. 
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effects of changes in Reg T margins to analyzing the procedures appropriate for setting 
prudent margins in future markets," from research from Hardouvelis? 
The 1987 stock market crash and the studies that followed resurfaced interest in 
margin policy and started a political and academic debate on efficacy of margin policy 
for common stocks and their derivative products said Jegadeesh.3 While a vast number of 
the stock market crash studies discussed margin policy in the context of market integrity, 
these studies reached considerably different conclusions. 
The New York Stock exchanges report on the crash, The Katzenbach Report, 
contradicts the conclusions ofFRB's 1984 margin study, and it provides no proofto 
defend this difference of opinion. After instituting its position on margin efficiency, the 
report then observes that the low margins and trading costs associated with the stock 
index futures products encourages speculation that ultimately leads to greater volatility in 
cash markets. The Katzenbach Report recommends raising margin requirements on stock 
index futures contracts and modifying futures settlement procedures to replace the 
leverage advantage enjoyed by stock index futures products. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission's report, "The October 1987 Market 
Break" (1988), largely agrees with the recommendations of the Katzenbach report. In 
comparison to the aforementioned studies, neither the Brady Commission report nor the 
report of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, clearly calls for raising 
derivative product margin 
2 Hardouvelis, Gikas, "Margin Requirements and ~tock Market Volatility," FRBNY Quarterly Review 
(Summer 1988). 
3 Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, "Liquidity Effects on the Introduction of the s&P 500 Index Futures Contract on 
Underlying Stocks," Journal of Business 66, no.2 (1993),171-187. 
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requirements. The Brady Commission Report (1988), " Report ofthe Presidential Task 
Force on Market Mechanisms," concludes" Margins should be made consistent across 
marketplaces to control speculation and financial leverage." Even though the Brady 
Commission seems to embrace the hypothesis that volatility and leverage are related, it 
did not suggest increasing margins on equity derivative products to correspond with 50% 
initial margin required on stock transactions. Regardless of recommending equalizing 
leverage, the Brady Commission was reluctant to suggest the appropriate level at which 
leverage should be balanced. 
Suggestions that margin requirements should be set to correspond with the 
leverage in stock and stock derivative contracts, led some to advise that regulatory 
changes that would confide stock and stock derivative margin-setting policy to a single 
regulator. Eventually, these suggestions led the U.S. Congress to allow the FRB margin-
setting authority over stock index futures contracts to the CFTC in 1993. The margin 
policy disagreement, apparent in the official reports that analyzed the 1987 crash, 
produced renewed academic interest in margin policy research said Grube. A powerful 
study by Hardouvelis (1988) came to the conclusion that historical evidence maintained 
the proposal that margin requirements could be used to control the stock market 
volatility. The conclusions by Hardouvelis study were questioned by many other studies, 
and the margin volatility literature expanded significantly. The empirical literature that 
followed the Hardouvelis study supports pre-cash academic view. Nevertheless, little 
direct empirical evidence provides the proposition that margin policy can be an effective 
tool in controlling stock market volatility. In spite of the predominate academic finding, 
some still take the view that margin requirements operate as the 1934 Congress 
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anticipated. Margin policy advocatel? defending their position by remarking that the 
insufficiency of strong direct econometric evidence can be easily enlarged. They claim 
that the true underlying market volatility relationship may be econometrically disguised 
by the infrequency with which margins have been changed, the substantial noise 
component in stock price and stock return data, and the inappropriate measurement 
techniques used in most margin volatility studies.4 
The conditional relationship between margin requirements and volatility is driven 
by leverage. While there certainly is a positive relationship between leverage and the 
return volatility of an individual investor's portfolio, the margin-volatility controversy 
considers the assertion that the return volatility ofunleveraged equity portfolios is 
decided at least in part by the amount of leverage preferred by individual investors. An 
essential circumstance for the existence of a negative margin volatility relationship is 
that, on average, there must be a positive association between the degree ofleverage in 
individual investor portfolios and the volatility in the underlying market. Of course, the 
margin recommendations of the three of the major post crash studies are assumed on the 
hypothesis that leverage enables speculators to produce unnecessary volatility. 
Considering the results of studies that measure the effects of derivative market 
introductions, this study concludes that no substantial body of evidence supports the 
hypothesis that margin requirements can be systematically retailored to control volatility 
in stock markets. The empirical evidence displays that, although Reg T margin 
requirements may decrease the volume of securities credit lending, and high futures 
margins do seem to be systematically correlated with lower stock return volatility. This 
4 Grube, R.c., "Market Responses to Federal Reserve Changes in the Initial Margin Requirement," 
Journal of Finance 34, no.3 (1979), 659-674. 
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evidence indicates little or no empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that tightening 
leverage constrains in either the cash or equity derivative markets will reduce stock return 
volatility. 
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II. 
The idea held behind the 1934 U.S Congress and those who continue to believe 
that high margin requirements continue volatility is that low initial margins enable 
speculators to exert undue influence in stock markets and therefore create excess 
volatility. It is alleged that speculators drive stock prices beyond their fundamental values 
through a process known as pyramiding. Pyramiding pertains to the dynamic in which 
gains in stock prices allow over confident agents to obtain additional funds for further 
equity purchases. When the unavoidable market correction begins, leveraged investors 
faced with margin calls are required to liquidate positions. The "depyramiding" process 
supposedly causes bypassing of the fundamental equilibrium. As a result, low margin 
requirements cause an additional source of volatility over the volatility attributable to 
fundamental economic forces. 
Despite the insightful appeal of this pyramiding-depyramiding explanation, it is at 
best failing to be complete. It distinguishes only one feasible avenue through which 
margin requirements may influence volatility. Goldberg developed a theoretical model 
that implies a positive relationship between margin requirements and stock price 
volatility. In Goldberg'S model, when investors are pressured by margin requirements, 
they bid up the prices of more highly leveraged firms and thereby encourage enhanced 
corporate leverage. In the consequent general equilibrium, corporate leverage is 
exchanged for private leverage and stock price volatility expands in response to increased 
corporate leverage. 
Kupiec and Sharpe formed an eqUilibrium model in which irrational speculators 
may cause excess stock price volatility. In contrast to pyramiding-depyramiding 
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hypothesis, this model implies the possibility of a positive relationship between margin 
requirements and excess stock market volatility. The model illustrates that high margin 
requirements may lower the equity purchases of liquidity-constrained rational investors 
when a shift in irrational trader demands creates a decline in equity prices. Because those 
who are willing to bear risk are confined from borrowing to purchase additional shares, 
equity prices descend below their fundamental values. Therefore, higher margin 
requirements produce greater equity price volatility. Relying on the characteristics of 
investors in the model, consistent with the pyramiding-depyramiding hypothesis, it also is 
feasible for margins to reduce volatility in the Kupiec-Sharpe model by limiting the 
leverage of irrationally optimistic agents. Given the possibility of these two contrasting 
cases, the Kupiec-Sharpe model proves that there is no unique theoretical relationship 
. between margin requirements and asset price volatility; from a theoretical point of view it 
is equally probable that low margin requirements may decrease stock price volatility as 
increase it. Surely, overtime the effects of margin requirements may change as the 
sources of excess stock price volatility change over time. 
9 
III. 
Before the late 1980's, essentially all published academic infonnation implied 
that changes in the Reg T margin requirements had no statistically calculable effect on 
stock price volatility, when volatility was measured by the standard deviation of the 
returns on a broad stock market index according to Kupiec. 
The 1988 study by Hardouvelis questioned Moore's discoveries and the results of 
earlier academic findings and came to the conclusion that, over the 1934-1987 period, 
monthly stock return volatility is systematically associated to the level of Reg T margin 
requirements. Hardouvelis discovers evidence of a statistically important negative 
correlation between the level of margins and the volatility of monthly S&P 500 stock 
returns. Hardouvelis explains this correlation in a causal way and detennines that Reg T 
margin requirements can be used to extend stock price volatility. Contradictory to the 
present literature, not only does Hardouvelis find a statistically important negative 
margin-volatility relationship he maintains that changes in margin can bring about 
substantial changes in monthly stock return volatility. According to Hardouvelis, a 10 
percentage point increase in Reg T margin requirement, on average, will result in a 8% 
decrease in stock return volatility in the following month and bigger reductions in the 
long run. In an extended study, Hardouvelis affinns his 1988 findings using a different 
measure of monthly stock return volatility. 
Succeeding the original Hardouvelis study and his extended analysis, a group of 
studies re-examined the margin-volatility issue. Ferris and Chance, Schwert, Salinger, 
Kupiec, and Hsieh and Miller all empirically examined the hypothesis that Reg T margin 
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requirements and stock price volatility are inversely related. Using dissimilar economic 
techniques to estimate time series aggregate stock return data, without exception, theses 
studies find no support for an inverse margin-volatility relationship. The outcome of 
results of these studies is that increases in volatility seem to precede increases in margin 
requirements. htcreases in margin requirements seem to reduce the volume of margin 
credit extended, but there is no evidence to recommend that the level of margin 
requirements and stock return volatility are systematically related. 
Hsieh and Miller indicate that the moving average constructions employed by 
Hardouvelis brings about a deceptive correlation between his measures of margin 
requirements and volatility. If one accurately accounts for this correlation, Hsieh and 
Miller show that there is no statistically significant margin-volatility relationship. 
Furthermore, corresponding to the pyramiding-depyramiding hypothesis, if margins are 
to have an effect, they must do so by changing the level of margin credit. Consequently, 
margin credit should not be recorded as an explanatory variable in Hardouvelis's 
expanded regression if it is attempting to measure volatility-magnifying effects of 
leverage. If margin credit is noted, the volatility regression measures the effect of margin 
requirements on volatility, keeping consistent the level of margin credit. According to 
the pyramiding-depyramiding hypothesis, there should be no margin effect if margin 
credit is established; and so the extended Hardouvelis model is misapprehended if it is 
trying to measure the effect of margin requirements on stock price volatility according to 
Miller. When Hsieh and Miller adjust the Hardouvelis analysis for these problems, they 
find no evidence of the claimed margin-volatility relationship. 
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In Hardouvelis's study, monthly stock return volatility is tested as a mUltiple of 
the absolute value of the residuals produced from a regression of monthly returns lagging 
12-month returns and 12 monthly dummy variables. Hardouvelis declares that this 
volatility modification invalidate the integrity of the original Schwert volatility estimator. 
Instead of restricted correspond~nce with more traditional measures of volatility, Hsieh 
and Miller reveal that Hardouvelis's measure produces volatility calculations with 
remarkably unattractive sample properties, including a "preponderance of extreme 
volatility estimates in the sample period." Hsieh and Miller determine that this volatility 
measure is unsatisfactory for analysis. 
The conclusions of studies that directly revisit Hardouvelis's analysis are 
expanded by studies that investigate the margin-volatility hypothesis using different 
experimental studies that explore the margin-volatility hypothesis using distinct 
experimental designs. Grube, Joy, and Howe explore the abnormal return effects 
produced when non-marginable OTC securities obtain margin eligibility status. They 
discover that these OTC stocks encounter a statistically significant abnormal positive 
price appreciation when they are recorded in the FRB's margin eligibility list and 
insignificant price effect if they are consequently eliminated from the list of margin able 
securities. When an OTC security is not marginable, investors must obtain the stock 
certificate and use it as collateral to secure credit. This undoubtedly is costly. Once 
marginable, the security can be left in street name at the broker and recorded as collateral 
in a margin account. Grube, Joy, and Howe consider that a subsequent delisting may not 
have an effect owing to a grandfather clause in Reg T that forbids new loans but permits 
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existing lending arrangements to co~tinue. They translate their findings as consistent 
with a Fed endorsement effect or a convenience effect. 
Seguin also studies the effects created when a sample of formerly non-marginable 
OTe stocks gain margin eligibility. In opposition to Grube and colleagues, Seguin 
studies the events' effect on voll;l.tilities, trading volumes, returns, and return 
autocorrelations. Seguin uncovers that, on average, margin eligibility is correlated with a 
2% decrease in stock volatility, about a 2% increase in average share value, and about a 
30% increase in trading volume where all the aforementioned effects are statistically 
important. 
Seguin and Jarrell explore the pyramiding-depyramiding hypothesis by examining 
the relative return and volume conduct of marginable and non-marginable stocks during 
the October 1987 stock market crash. They discuss that, since margin credit was at a 
historical high during October 1987 and there is information that the crash accelerated 
substantial margin call activity, if depyramiding price constrains exist, they should be 
especially apparent in the return profiles of marginable stocks during the crash period. 
Seguin and Jarrell discover that, during the crash, marginable securities accomplished 
higher excess volumes relative to non-marginable securities, about 14 to .40%, as 
anticipated by margin-call depyramiding hypothesis. In spite of greater excess trading 
volumes, Seguin and Jarrell notice that the price declines recorded bymarginable 
securities were less extreme than those recorded by non-marginable securities. 
Apart from the questioned claims ofHardouvelis studies, the conclusions of the 
balance of studies that investigate the effects of Reg T margin requirements propose that, 
while margin requirements can have effects on the level of margin credit and equity 
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trading volumes, no immediate evidence supports the proposition that Reg T margin 
requirements can be used to restrain stock return volatility. 
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IV. 
In the late 1980's, the margin volatility controversy advanced from Reg T margin 
requirements to the margin requirements on stock index futures products. Margin 
requirements in futures markets assist as a performance bond guarantee. In futures 
markets, margins are intended to preserve the futures clearinghouse from the risk 
produced from a single-days potential loss in contracts value. Owing to the institutional 
differences in futures-style trading and settlement, the margin needed to control a 
clearinghouse's one-day risk exposure on a futures contract is far smaller than the 50% 
initial margin requirement that has been set by the FRB to "protect" lenders in security 
transactions according to Ferris. 
The distinction in required margin between futures and cash transactions causes a 
leverage advantage for stock index futures products. Likewise, the leverage available 
using individual stock options dominate that available in the cash market. Furthermore, 
individual stock options and stock index futures permit traders to circle the short selling 
rules that prevail in the cash market. If the leverage is the source of "excess" volatility in 
the stock markets, the beginning of stock options and stock index futures trading should 
have had sizeable effects on the volatility in the stock market. 
Even though it is distinct that stock index futures products and options 
transactions have an important transactions cost and leverage advantage over direct cash 
market purchases or sales, it is a disputable question whether or not this leverage benefit 
is of any consequence for the volatility of returns in the underlying stock market. This 
controversy has at least two distinguishable aspects: Does the introduction of a 
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derivatives market influence the return volatility of the underlying instrument, and 
supplied with the existence of the derivative product, does a change in its margin 
requirement affect the price volatility of the underlying instrument? The succeeding 
sections will review the scientific information that relates to these logically 
distinguishable issues. 
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v. 
Theoretical Models can be assembled to explore the effects of introducing a 
derivative market on the volatility in the underlying cash market. Tumovsky and 
Campbell unfolded an equilibrium model planned to assess the volatility and welfare 
implications connected with the introduction of a futures market. Because their model is 
highly nonlinear, they can only simulate equilibrium. They find that, in essentially all 
model arrangements, the introduction of a futures market either stabilizes cash market 
prices or has no effect on volatility. Weller and Yano also examine this question in a 
two-good, two-agent model with exogenous stochastic output. They discover that the 
introduction of a futures market has two effects: a price arbitrage effect and wealth 
transfer effect. ''The price arbitrage effect unambiguously reduces price volatility in the 
cash market, but the volatility effects engendered by the wealth transfers that result from 
futures market trading are ambiguous as they depend on the heterogeneity in the trading 
populations' utility functions," says Weller. 
Detemple and Selden model the effects of introducing a call option contract into 
an unfinished market setting, where assets comprise of only a stock and risk-free bond. 
They reveal that the price and return volatility of the stock in general will be influenced 
by the introduction of the derivative security. For a given set of endowments, when a 
derivative is introduced into an incomplete market setting with sufficiently diverse 
agents, the derivative agreement will be traded. Derivative trading will simplify a 
reallocation of consumption, which will be mirrored by a change in the equilibrium price 
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and return characteristics of the underlying security. In a distinct quadratic utility 
example, Detemple and Selden explain that the introduction of the derivative will expand 
the price of the security and decrease its return volatility. 
Stein discovered a "theoretical model in which the introduction of a futures 
market can destabilize cash market prices." In the Stein model, the presence or absence 
of a futures market does not influence speculators by altering their constraint. Rather, 
misguided speculators are unable to trade in the spot market by assumption. When a 
futures market is introduced, speculators can trade and their trading may affect the data 
content of spot market prices. In this setting, Stein fonns the theoretical possibility that 
the ''noise'' in speculators' infonnation sets can cause spot market price volatility that 
cannot be distinguished from the underlying "fundamental" volatility by the other traders 
in this model. The beginning of a futures market allows the imperfectly educated 
speculators to trade, and their trading deceives the infonnation content of market clearing 
spot prices. Because spot traders are risk averse and cannot distinguish between price 
shocks that owe to fundamental supply disturbances and those affected by the demands of 
imperfectly educated speculators, their inventory holdings are less responsive to price 
shocks when imperfectly infonned speculators are permitted to trade in the futures 
market. The change in spot traders' inventory assets leads to additional spot price 
volatility and reduce social welfare. 
Stein translates his model as a fonnal counterexample to the speculation that the 
addition of speculators to an existing market will add to the depth and liquidity of the 
market and thereby decrease the price effects produced by temporary shocks to demand 
or supply. Although agents voluntarily trade with the new futures market speculators, 
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they may be made worse off. Stein's results are a distinct example of Hart's general 
finding that, when markets are imperfect, opening another market may make agents 
worse off if markets stay incomplete. In both the Hart and Stein models, it is important 
that leverage does not playa role in creating the destabilizing price speculation or the loss 
in social welfare. 
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VI. 
Edwards discusses the manner of cash market volatility in samples surrounding 
the introductions of four financial futures contracts: S&P 500, Value Line, 9-Day 
Eurodollars, and 90-Day T -Bill fUture contracts. Edwards tested volatility before and 
after the introduction of each financial futures contract, aside from data during the 1979-
1982 period when the Federal Reserve adjusted its operating procedures. Succeeding the 
beginning of financial futures contracts trading, except for stock in 1987, volatility was 
lower in all cash markets in all years after the introduction of financial futures contract. 
Even though he does distinguish the expiration-day volatility effects on S&P 500 stock 
index transitory, Edwards determines that, on balance, the statistical evidence strongly 
suggests that cash market volatility has been lower following the introduction of the 
financial futures contracts examined in his study. 
The Edwards study is just one study in a somewhat large literature that explores 
the affects of the introduction of S&P 500 stock index future contract trading on the 
underlying return volatilities of the stocks in the composite index. Apart from any shift 
in volatility that may owe to improved leverage opportunities reduced by.the factors may 
alter the returns volatility of the stocks in the futures contract index, such as a change in 
the frequency with which stocks trade. Additional factors that may effect returns 
volatility are changes in individual stocks' bid-ask spreads that may owe to the 
introduction of stock index futures trading and changes in transactions cost of trading on 
macro-financial information. 
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Revisions in stock values may be connected to changes in economy wide factors 
that fInns' values and changes in value that owe to distinctive fInn developments. 
Although true underlying stock prices may change continuously as economy wide and 
fInn specifIc news is dispersed, new share valuations are observed only infrequently 
when a trade occurs. If investors employ new infonnation effIciently, true underlying 
stock price changes will be uncorrelated. As true underlying stock price changes are not 
observed instantaneously, occasional trading will cause the returns on a stock index, 
assembled from observed trade prices to be positively autocorelated and less volatile than 
the return on the true stock index value. 
The beginning of stock index futures contract can have considerable effects on the 
volatility of the measured stock index, even if it has no effect on the volatility of the 
underlying true value of the index. Stock index futures prices and the true underlying 
prices of individual stocks in a stock index contract are strongly related through an 
absence of arbitrage cost of carry condition: 
F t = S~(r-d)(T-l) ( 1 ) 
Where Ft is the futures price at time t, St is the true value of the stock index at time t, r is 
the cost of carry rate of interest, d is the continuous dividend yield on the stock index, 
and T is the contract maturity date. Should equation (1) fail to hold, an arbitrage profIt 
can be made created by taking appropriate positions in the stock index futures and the 
underlying stocks in the index. If r and d are roughly constant over short time intervals, 
equation (1) implies that the volatility of rate of return on the true value of the stock 
index and the volatility of the return on the index futures contract are equal. Owing to 
transactions costs, equation (1) will not held exactly; when St is returned by the measured 
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index value, the volatility of the returns to the futures contract will surpass the volatility 
of the returns to the measured stock index, owing to the affects of occasional trading. 
Lacking an index futures contract, individual shares trade with a frequency that 
can for present functions be taken as exogenous. The opening of a stock index futures 
contract may intensify the average frequency of trading in individual stocks because, 
when index arbitrage becomes profitable, investors must trade all shares in the index to 
profit from the arbitrage. Index arbitrage trades that communicate no new information 
will have no effect on the true underlying share price or return volatility and yet the 
intensified frequency of trading will enhance the volatility and reduce the autocorrelation 
of measured stock index returns. On the other hand, if the introduction of index futures 
contract trading reduces the transactions costs of trading on new macro-economic 
information, macro information will be reflected more quickly in index futures prices, 
and these price changes will be transferred through index arbitrage movement to the cash 
market, where they will be considered as an increase in individual stock return volatility. 
Again, such an escalation in volatility is unrelated to leverage. 
Harris explores the hypothesis that the beginning of S&P 500 index futures 
contract enhances the volatility of the underlying instruments. Harris uses a regression 
model to explain the yearly return variance characteristics for stocks included in the S&P 
500 index and the yearly return variance for a sample of similar non-index stocks. Harris 
examines volatility distinctions for each year between 1975-1987. In previous index 
futures trading, Harris discovers no statistically noteworthy distinction in return volatility 
after controlling each stocks beta, size, price level, and a measure of trade frequency. 
Following the introduction of index futures, Harris discovers that short-horizon returns of 
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S&P 500 stocks are more volatile when evaluated to comparable non-S&P 500 stocks. 
The common distinctions in S&P 500 daily stock return volatility during the futures 
trading period are very small between .03 and .14%, and likely unimportant economically 
when measure up to an average daily return standard deviation of about 2% in his sample. 
Even though the predictable daily distinctions are small, post-index futures daily return 
volatility differences, however, are statistically different from zero in 1985, 1986, and 
1987. 
Jagadeesh and Subrahmanyam supply some results that may in part clarify the 
Harris "excess volatility" findings as a result of competitive market making behavior and 
speculative excess. Jegadeesh and Subrahnymam test a hypothesis produced by 
Subrahmanyam and Gorton and Penacchi. The hypothesis suggests that, "because the 
adverse selection charges implicit in the average bid-ask spreads of individual stocks are 
likely to be much larger than the adverse selection component of a stock index future 
market maker's quote, uninfonned traders face incentives to redirect their trades from 
individual stocks to the index futures contract." The movement ofuninfonned traders 
increases the proportion of infonned traders faced by market makers for individual 
stocks, and individual share bid-ask spreads are forecasted to broaden consequently. 
To examine the unifonned trader migration hypothesis, Jegadeesh and 
Subrahmanyam observe "mouth to end" bid-ask spreads for a sample of firms included in 
the S&P 500 index and a arbitrary sample of non-index finns generally comparable size 
in a period that encompasses the introduction of S&P 500 index futures trading. After 
controlling for the common bid-ask spread explanatory variables, they discover that the 
average proportional spreads increased subsequent to the introduction of index future 
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trading. Furthermore, they find that bid-ask spreads increased considerably more for 
S&P 500 stocks, but the increase in the magnitudes of implied trading cost is not 
economically important. These changes in bid-ask spreads could imply a greater bid-ask 
spread component in daily stock return volatility estimates. 
Hong and Subrahmanyam used intra-day data to assess the impact that may have 
been conveyed by the introduction of the Major Market Index (MMI) index futures 
contract on the bid-ask spreads and volatilities of the individual stocks in the MMI index. 
Even though the MMI was established after the S&P 500, and all the MMI stocks are 
included in the S&P 500 index, no intra-day data is obtainable to study the effects of the 
S&P 500 futures contract introduction said Hong. When exploring intra-day volatility, 
Hong and Subrahmanyam removed the effects of bid ask spread and discovered no 
evidence that the introduction ofMMI futures trading distorted intra-day volatility in the 
sample period. 
Kamara, Miller, and Siegel examine the results of the S&P 500 index futures 
market trading on the return distribution of the S&P 500 index. "Using univariate 
nonparametric tests to correct for the abnormality in the underlying return distribution, in 
contrast to Edwards, they find that daily return distributions exhibit higher volatility in 
the post-index futures sample period," said Kupiec. Similar to Harris, they discover that 
longer-horizon return volatility is unchanged by the introduction of the stock index 
futures trading. Even though the measured distinctions in daily return volatility, the 
authors conclude that the observed changes in volatility do not owe to the introduction of 
the stock index futures contract. Rather, they demonstrate that, if the pre- and post index 
futures sample periods are arbitrarily split, the data show statistically important evidence 
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of shifting daily return variances. They come to the conclusion that daily return 
variances are non-stationary and the non-stationarity is irrelevant to the introduction of 
stock index futures trading. 
Kamara and colleagues also study the number of outlier returns in the pre- and 
post index futures trading period. They cannot discard the hypothesis that there are more 
outliers in the sample period with index futures trading. Certainly the data shows that 
positive return outliers are far more prevalent when index futures are trading. If October 
1987 is excluded from the sample however, outliers are just as likely with or without 
index futures. In a "multivariate analysis" proposed to monitor for macro-economic 
sources of variation in the S&P 500 returns, Kamara and colleagues research whether the 
regression's residual volatility changes between the pre- and post-index futures trading 
samples. If October 1987 is excluded from the sample, the post-index futures residual 
volatility is considerably smaller than the residual volatility before S&P 500 stock index 
futures were introduced. Including October 1987, the post-index futures residual 
variance is roughly twice as large as the pre-index futures sample residual variance. 
They come to the conclusion that, unless one believes that the futures markets caused the 
1987 crash, futures markets do not appear to have increased the S&P 500's "excess 
volatility." 
Bessembinder and Seguin research the correlation between the cash volatility of 
the S&P 500 index, trading volume in both cash and futures markets, and open interest in 
the future market over the sample period January 1978 to September 1989. They 
decompose cash and futures markets volumes into three components that "correspond 
with the long-term trend, a transitory expected component, and an unexpected 
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component." Bessembinder and Seguin discover that the unexpected component of cash 
trading volume is positively associated to volatility in the spot market, and the beginning 
of futures contracts trading attenuates this volatility-volume relationship. They also 
discover that the volatility in the cash market is also is negatively related to the expected 
component of futures trading volume. Therefore, unlike the well-known positive 
volume-volatility relationship apparent in the cash market, increases in the expected 
component of futures trading volume are connected with lower, not higher, cash market 
volatility. As in the cash market, they discover that the unanticipated futures trading 
volume is positively related to cash market volatility. Bessembinder and Seguin suggest 
that their results are consistent with the hypothesis that futures markets improve the 
liquidity and the depth of markets. They find no indication that supports the hypothesis 
that futures markets are "a conduit for destabilizing speculation." 
While the empirical evidence relating to the introduction of equity index futures 
contracts recommends that derivative market introductions, on average have had a 
stabilizing influence on the stock return volatility. Some evidence implies that the 
existence of derivative products may have exacerbated transitory spikes in volatility. For 
instance, Stoll and Whaley discovered that the introduction of stock index futures led to 
substantially higher cash market volatility on index futures expiration days, and certainly 
recognition of these effects led to modifications in contract expiration procedures that 
seem to have attenuated expiration day volatility effects. Another potential of derivative-
related transitory volatility is the behavior of S&P 500 stock returns during the October 
1987 crash. Even though it is unclear whether the underlying order disparities owe to the 
existence of the S&P 500 index in futures contract, Blume, MacKinlay and Tecker 
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uncover evidence that, during the 19~7 crash period, stocks included in the S&P 500 
index experienced larger transitory increase in non S&P 500 stocks. 
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VII. 
After studying the academic evidence that investigates the relationship between 
margin and volatility in both cash and futures markets and believing the results of studies 
that measure the effects of derivative market introductions, this study comes to the 
conclusion that no considerable body of evidence supports the hypothesis that margin 
requirements can be systematically distorted to manage the volatility in stock markets. 
The empirical evidence demonstrates that, while Reg T margin requirements may lower 
the volume of securities credit lending and high futures margins do appear to reduce the 
open interest in futures contracts, neither of these measurable effects appears to be 
systematically associated with lower stock return volatility. The evidence to date 
suggests that, contrary to the leverage arguments believed by the pyramiding-
depyramiding hypothesis and explicitly accepted by many of the official studies of the 
1987 stock market crash, no scientific evidence supports the hypothesis that tightening 
leverage constraints in either the cash or derivative markets will reduce stock return 
volatility. 
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